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**MEASURING IMPACTS OF STABILIZATION  
INITIATIVES (MISTI):  
BASELINE STABILIZATION TRENDS AND IMPACT  
EVALUATION SURVEY**

USAID Afghanistan  
February 2, 2013



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## Presentation Outline

- MISTI program
- Stability defined
- Mapping key indicators
- 5 districts: Sources of stability and instability
- Next step: Impact evaluations



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## **MISTI Program**

- 3 years, \$21 Million: March 2012 – 2015
- Community of practice for Stabilization M&E and learning
- Build strong M&E systems: rigorously defined indicators, high standards for data verification and data quality
- Create stability indicators and measure change over time
- Evaluate program performance and program impacts
- Communicate best practices and lessons learned



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## How Stabilization is Different from Development

- Administrator's guidance (January 2011): "Stability is a *necessary precursor* for our long-term development goals; stabilization programming often has different objectives, beneficiaries, modalities, and measurement tools than long-term development programming."
- The objective of stabilization programming is to establish an environment that is sufficiently stable for development to take place.



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## Defining Stability

- Prevailing belief in and support for the decisions and actions of local leaders and government that affect the lives of people in a given community
- Measured through specific perceptions
- People in stable areas judge physical security, quality of life, economic opportunities, and local leaders to be satisfactory, receive fair treatment from their local government and legal authorities, and find that these things are predictable in the daily course of life.
- Stabilization equals improvement in these perceptions



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## Scope of the Survey

Baseline (September-October 2012):

- 83 Districts: All 76 stabilization program districts plus 7 control districts with no programming
- 2,200 villages
- 25 enumerator teams, 1,185 enumerators (403 female, 782 male)
- 34,972 survey respondents
- 4 additional waves of data collection 2013-2014



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
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## Survey Sampling Design

- Stability trends: Representative sample of district population
- Impact evaluations: Village coverage
- Multistage stratified random sample
  1. Villages
  2. Households
  3. Respondents
- Stratification by population and distance from district center to capture future stabilization activity sites

## QARABAGH DISTRICT

Population Buffers



640 survey respondents / 40 villages

Strata 1 = 448 respondents / 28 villages (70% of Sampling Points)

Strata 2 = 128 respondents / 8 villages (20% of Sampling Points)

Strata 3 = 64 respondents / 4 villages (10% of Sampling Points)





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
## The Stability Index

- District-level analysis
- Stability scores are relational, comparative
- Stability defined for Afghan context
- Index Composition:
  - Survey questions (70%)
  - District accessibility ratings from survey firm (10%)
  - Local area control (Survey Observational) (10%)
  - Frequency of violent incidents (UNDSS and British Embassy) (5%)




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
# STABILITY INDEX (COMPOSITE)

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012)



## STABILITY INDEX (COMPOSITE)


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
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
# CHANGE IN SECURITY IN LOCAL AREA

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012)



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






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
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
# CONFIDENCE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

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


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
## IMPROVEMENT IN SERVICES FROM THE GOVERNMENT

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
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
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


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# CORRUPTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT


## MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012)





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







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
# DISTRICT MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012)



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
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
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
# RESILIENCE IN LOCAL AREA

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012)



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


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
## QUALITY OF LIFE

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept - Dec 2012)



# QUALITY OF LIFE


MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012)





# QUALITY OF LIFE


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
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
# PRESENCE OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS

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




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## Endorsement experiment: Indirectly measures support for Taliban and Karzai vs. “The democratically elected government of Afghanistan”





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## **The population supports “The Democratically Elected Government of Afghanistan” over the Taliban and Karzai**


- +11% greater support for the policy with GIRoA endorsement compared to Taliban endorsement
  - GIRoA viewed much more favorably than Taliban
- +3% greater support for the policy with GIRoA endorsement compared to Karzai endorsement
  - GIRoA viewed slightly more favorably than Karzai
- >99% confidence
- Pools all indirect questions, all respondents





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
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## 5 District Deep Dive

District	Province	Region	N	SI
Puli Khumri	Baghlan	RC-North	630	1.95
Moqur	Badghis	RC-West	589	2.60
Khas Kunar	Kunar	RC-East	654	2.55
Qalat	Zabul	RC-South	623	3.00
Chak	Wardak	RC-East	654	3.32



## PULI KHUMRI





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
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## Puli Khumri: Sources of Stability and Instability

Sources of Stability, OLS Regression, R-Squared = .347	
1	District Governor is responsive
2	District Government is responsive
3	Improved Provincial Governor's ability to get things done
4	No presence of Afghan Local Police
5	Local area is more secure than it was a year ago
6	Local leaders are effective at securing funds from the government
7	Confidence in Afghan National Police
8	Confidence in ISAF
9	Local leaders are responsive
10	Villages/neighborhoods work together to solve problems
11	No presence of Afghan National Army
12	The situation is certain enough to make plans for the future
13	Corruption is not a problem in this area
14	Improved Afghan National Police ability to provide security

Sources of Instability, OLS Regression, R-Squared = .326	
1	No confidence in Afghan National Army
2	Worsened Afghan National Police's ability to provide security
3	District Governor is unresponsive
4	Worsened local leaders' ability to get things done
5	Local area is less secure than it was a year ago
6	District Government is unresponsive
7	Presence of Arbaki
8	The Afghan government is not well regarded in this area
9	The District Government officials are not doing their jobs honestly
10	The situation in this area is too uncertain to make plans

## MOQUR





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
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## Moqur: Sources of Stability and Instability

Sources of Stability, OLS Regression, R-Squared = .339	
1	The Afghan government is well regarded in this area
2	Local area is more secure than it was a year ago
3	Local leaders are responsive
4	Confidence in Afghan Local Police
5	Participation in local decision-making activities
6	Provincial Governor is responsive
7	District Government is responsive
8	Improved Afghan National Police ability to provide security
9	Decisions made by local leaders consider interests of ordinary people

Sources of Instability, OLS Regression, R-Squared = .318	
1	Dissatisfaction with provision of electricity
2	Non-participation in groups where people get together
3	Services from the government have worsened in the past year
4	Local area is less secure than it was a year ago
5	Provincial Governor is unresponsive
6	Non-participation in local decision-making activities
7	Local leaders are unresponsive
8	The Afghan government is not well regarded in this area
9	District Government is unresponsive
10	District Government officials abuse their authority to make money for themselves

## KHAS KUNAR





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
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## Khas Kunar: Sources of Stability and Instability

Sources of Stability, OLS Regression, R-Squared = .470	
1	Confidence in Afghan Local Police
2	Local area is more secure than it was a year ago
3	Provincial Governor is responsive
4	Services from the government improved in the past year
5	Improved Provincial Governor's ability to get things done
6	Improved District Governor's ability to get things done
7	Satisfaction with provision of services - Retaining and flood walls
8	District Government is responsive
9	District Governor is responsive
10	Satisfaction with provision of water for irrigation and uses other than drinking
11	Satisfaction with provision of services - Roads and bridges
12	The situation is certain enough to make plans for the future
13	Local leaders are effective at securing funds from the government

Sources of Instability, OLS Regression, R-Squared = .395	
1	Services from the government have worsened in the past year
2	District Governor is unresponsive
3	No confidence in Afghan Local Police
4	District Government is unresponsive
5	Provincial Governor is unresponsive
6	Dissatisfaction with provision of water for irrigation
7	Worsened District Government's ability to get things done
8	The situation is too uncertain to make plans for the future
9	Local leaders are ineffective at securing funds from the government
10	Dissatisfaction with provision of electricity
11	The District Government officials are not doing their jobs honestly
12	District Government officials abuse their authority to make money for themselves

## QALAT







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
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## Qalat: Sources of Stability and Instability

Sources of Stability, OLS Regression, R-Squared = .847	
1	The Afghan government is well regarded in this area
2	Confidence in Afghan National Army
3	Satisfaction with provision of agricultural assistance
4	Local area is more secure than it was a year ago
5	The District Government understands the problems of people in this area
6	Satisfaction with provision of clean drinking water
7	The situation is certain enough to make plans for the future
8	No presence of Armed opposition groups
9	Services from the government improved in the past year
10	Local leaders are effective at securing funds from the government

Sources of Instability, OLS Regression, R-Squared = .870	
1	Local area is less secure than it was a year ago
2	No confidence in Afghan National Army
3	Services from the government have worsened in the past year
4	Worsened District Government's ability to get things done
5	No confidence in Arbaki
6	Provincial Governor is unresponsive
7	No confidence in Afghan National Police
8	The District Government does not care about the people in this area
9	No confidence in Armed Opposition Groups
10	Dissatisfaction with provision of clean drinking water

CHAK





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## Chak: Sources of Stability and Instability

Sources of Stability, OLS Regression, R-Squared = .147

1	Local area is more secure than it was a year ago
2	District Government is responsive
3	The District Government officials are doing their jobs honestly
4	Satisfaction with provision of water for irrigation and uses other than drinking
5	The District Government delivers basic services in a fair manner
6	Satisfaction with provision of services - Roads and bridges
7	Provincial Governor is responsive
8	Local leaders are effective at securing funds from the government
9	Local village/neighborhood leaders are responsive

Sources of Instability, OLS Regression, R-Squared = .138

1	Worsened District Governor's ability to get things done
2	Local area is less secure than it was a year ago
3	District Government is unresponsive
4	Local leaders are ineffective at securing funds from the government
5	The District government does not deliver basic services in a fair manner
6	Dissatisfaction with provision of water for irrigation
7	The District Government officials are not doing their jobs honestly



## Village analysis: Pair matching

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Details

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Contents

☒ MISTI Survey Villages W1

☒ MISTI Villages

☒ Regional Command

☒ Provincial Boundaries

☐ Stabilization Districts

☒ Imagery


**MISTI Survey Villages W1 (34,972 features)**

SRV_QST_2	SRV_QST_3	UTILITIES	SRV_QC	METHD_QC	VILL_DESC	PROGRAM	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	VIL_UID	VIL_NAME
0	0	4	2	4		4	18	13	CHK-060	FAZIL KHAIL
0	0	4	2	4		4	18	13	CHK-060	FAZIL KHAIL
0	0	4	2	4		4	18	13	CHK-060	FAZIL KHAIL
0	0	4	2	4		4	18	13	CHK-060	FAZIL KHAIL

Table Options




# Cluster analysis: Area matching



Univariate village level regression:

- Each log-unit increase on the y-axis disbursement scale equals a 6% increase in the likelihood that a survey respondent will report improved stability.
- Villages with programmatic disbursements are ordered on the x-axis from smallest to largest disbursement

### Total Programmatic Disbursement (mean per village)





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**QUESTIONS?**



**Binary Logistic Regression**  
**Mixed effects model: # individuals = 2654, # villages = 95, # Districts 42**

<b>Stability improved in the past 3 months</b>		<b>Odds Ratio</b>	<b>Confidence</b>
<u>Village</u> <u>Effects</u>	Irrigation improved with community contribution	<b>1.06</b>	<b>99%</b>
	Disbursement on activities underway	<b>1.06</b>	<b>99%</b>
<u>Individual</u> <u>Predictors of</u> <u>Stability</u>  1 = positive response  0 = negative response or no change	GIROA's ability to provide security improved	<b>3.12</b>	<b>99%</b>
	Roads became easier to travel	<b>2.36</b>	<b>99%</b>
	GIROA services improved	<b>1.97</b>	<b>99%</b>
	Food has become easier to obtain	<b>1.57</b>	<b>99%</b>
	GIROA has become more responsive	<b>1.55</b>	<b>99%</b>
	GIROA's ability to provide potable water improved	<b>1.39</b>	<b>99%</b>
<p>Village effect = 0    LGCD activities explain why respondents in the same village share perceptions of improved stability</p> <p>District effect = 10%    Add district variables such as GIROA presence and security conditions to explain why people living in the same district share perceptions of changes in stability</p>			